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With a Little Help from the Opposition? 
Relaxing Term Limits in the Argentine 
Provinces, 1983–2017 
Adrián Lucardi and María Gabriela Almaraz 
Abstract: How do incumbents manage to relax term limits when they can-
not impose their preferences unilaterally? Interpreting constitutional reforms 
as a bargaining game between a term-limited executive and the opposition, 
we argue that reforms involving term limits should be more likely when (a) 
the incumbent party can change the constitution unilaterally, or (b) the op-
position is pessimistic about its future electoral prospects; moreover, (c) this 
second effect should be stronger when a single opposition party has veto 
power over a reform because this precludes the executive from playing a 
“divide-and-rule” strategy. We examine these claims with data from the 
Argentine provinces between 1983 and 2017. In line with expectations, the 
results show that the probability of initiating a reform is highest when the 
executive’s party controls a supermajority of seats, but falls sharply when a 
single opposition party has veto power over a reform and this party expects 
to do well in the next executive election. 
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Executive term limits have long been a contested issue in Latin America 
(Carey 2003; Serrafero 1997, 2010; Negretto 2013; Penfold-Becerra, 
Corrales, and Hernández 2014).1 In a region where presidents and gov-
ernors are widely perceived as the strongest political players (Mainwaring 
1990; Samuels and Abrucio 2000; Calvo and Escolar 2005; Calvo and 
Murillo 2005; Spiller and Tommasi 2007; Langston 2010; Rosas and 
Langston 2011), the question of whether they should be allowed to seek 
reelection naturally leads to heated political arguments. This debate re-
surfaced during the third wave of democratization, when several presi-
dents – such as Alberto Fujimori, Carlos Menem, Hugo Chávez, Álvaro 
Uribe, Evo Morales, and Rafael Correa – promoted constitutional 
changes that would allow them to run for an additional term in office, 
sometimes more than once. Their success in consolidating their power 
through constitutional change raised concerns that they had become 
“invincible” (Penfold-Becerra, Corrales, and Hernández 2014) or “could 
not be stopped” (Corrales 2016).  
In other countries, attempts to relax term limits have led to violent 
protests and even coups, as seen recently in Honduras and Paraguay (The 
Economist 2009, 2017). Similar phenomena can be observed in other parts 
of the world where presidents dominate the political arena, notably Sub-
Saharan Africa and former Soviet countries (Maltz 2007; Young and 
Posner 2007; Cheeseman 2010; Baturo 2010, 2014; Ginsburg, Melton, 
and Elkins 2011). Nor is the issue limited to the national level: as state 
governors became crucial political players in federal countries like Argen-
tina, Brazil, Mexico, or Venezuela, subnational term limits became in-
creasingly prominent. In both Brazil (1997) and Venezuela (2009), the 
president secured gubernatorial support for his reelection drive by pro-
posing a similar measure for subnational governors (da Silva and D’Alva 
Kinzo 1999; Corrales and Penfold-Becerra 2011). In Argentina, guberna-
torial term limits are set at the local rather than the national level; how-
                                                 
1  Financial support from the Asociación Mexicana de Cultura, AC is gratefully 
acknowledged. The authors also thank Germán Lodola, Margit Tavits, Frank 
Thames, Guillermo Rosas, Marcelo Nazareno, Brian F. Crisp and 10 anony-
mous reviewers for their helpful comments to previous versions of this paper. 
Carlos Gervasoni, Agustina Giraudy, Germán Lodola, Mark P. Jones, and Se-
bastián Saiegh kindly shared their data on Argentine provincial politics. Earlier 
versions of this paper were presented at the 2013 MPSA Annual Meeting, the 
2013 Symposium on Scholarship and a Free Society and the XI Congress of the 
Sociedad Argentina de Análisis Político, where it won the Guillermo O’Donnell 
Prize on Comparative Politics. The authors thank participants at those venues 
for their helpful comments. All remaining mistakes are the sole responsibility of 
the authors. 
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ever, while no governor could run for reelection in 1983, today this re-
striction only remains in place in two provinces. 
Two issues often remain overlooked. The first is that only a minori-
ty of executives are able to relax term limits.2 Of the 63 Latin American 
presidents who were term-limited at the beginning of their mandate and 
finished their term between 1990 and 2013, only 11 (17.5 percent) 
changed the constitution in order to run for another term (Kouba 2016). 
Even among those who manifested a willingness to relax term limits, just 
62.5 percent (15 out of 24) were successful (Corrales 2016). Similarly, of 
the 110 Argentine governors who were term-limited at the beginning of 
their mandate, only 28 (25.5 percent) were no longer term-limited when 
they finished it. The second – and more surprising – issue is that term 
limits are often relaxed with opposition support: 31.6 percent (12 out of 
38) of the elected presidents who managed to relax term limits between 
1960 and 2009 controlled less than two-thirds of seats in the national 
legislature, a proportion that increases to 73.3 percent (22 out of 30) 
among Argentine governors.3 
In this paper, we seek to explain this combination of outcomes. 
Given that executives who fail to relax term limits often lack a superma-
jority of seats in the legislature, what explains the variation in opposition 
support for relaxing term limits? If the distributional consequences of 
term limits are so obvious – they clearly benefit the incumbent at the 
expense of those who aspire to succeed him or her, both within the 
incumbent’s party and in the opposition– why would opposition leaders 
ever help the incumbent to run for another term? Even though the re-
laxation of presidential term limits has received substantial attention 
recently (Baturo 2010, 2014; Negretto 2013; Corrales 2016; Kouba 2016), 
the existing literature is ill-equipped to answer these questions. By study-
ing the case of the Argentine provinces between 1983 and 2017, we seek 
to overcome this gap both with a new argument and a novel research 
design. 
Theoretically, the literature has either ignored the role of the oppo-
sition in the reform process (Shugart 1998; Baturo 2010, 2014; Corrales 
2016; Kouba 2016) or noted that constitutional reforms involving term 
                                                 
2  We speak of “relaxing” term limits rather than “removing” them because 
constitutional reforms often let the incumbent run for an additional term, but 
fall short of eliminating term limits altogether. 
3  The list of presidents who relaxed term limits comes from Baturo (2014, Table 
3.5). In both cases, the numerator is restricted to those executives who con-
trolled less than a two-thirds majority and passed a constitutional reform through 
the legislature. 
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limits often result from an agreement between the government and the 
opposition: the latter votes in favor of relaxing term limits in exchange 
for some valuable institutional concession(s), such as a restriction of the 
executive’s powers (Almaraz 2010; Negretto 2013). However, this raises 
the question of why some opposition parties are willing to negotiate with 
the executive while others remain adamantly opposed to such a move. In 
this paper, we argue that the opposition faces a trade-off between (a) 
maximizing its chances of winning the next executive election by keeping 
term limits in place, and (b) supporting a constitutional change that will 
relax term limits in exchange for valuable institutional concessions. Thus, 
opposition leaders should be more willing to relax term limits when they 
expect to perform badly in the next executive election. Furthermore, this 
effect should be stronger when a single opposition party can veto a con-
stitutional reform because this precludes the executive from playing a 
“divide-and-rule” strategy against his or her adversaries. Thus, and in 
contrast to the large literature on power-sharing versus power-con-
centrating reforms, which predicts that legislative fragmentation always 
leads to power-sharing outcomes (Elster 1995; Frye 1997; Boix 1999; 
Benoit 2004; Chavez 2003, 2004; Díaz-Cayeros 2005; Finkel 2005; Fere-
john, Rosenbluth, and Shipan 2007; Negretto 2006, 2009, 2013; Leiras, 
Giraudy, and Tuñón 2015), we claim that a fragmented opposition should 
make a power-concentrating reform more rather than less likely.4 
In terms of research design, instead of treating the reform process 
as a black box, we focus on the interaction between the government and 
the opposition in the legislature and, later, on the behavior of the constituent 
assembly in charge of determining the final constitutional text. To appre-
ciate the significance of our approach, consider Figure 1a, which high-
lights the three stages typically involved in most constitutional reform 
processes. In the initiation stage, some player – not necessarily the incum-
bent executive – may propose a constitutional reform to the legislature. 
If no reform is proposed, the constitution remains as it is; otherwise, we 
move to the legislative stage.  
                                                 
4  Eaton (2004) recognized the importance of internal divisions for institutional 
change, but he focused on federalism and decentralization rather than govern-
ment-opposition relations. Our logic is closer to the more sophisticated work 
of Weingast (1997), Acemoglu, Robinson, and Verdier (2004), Svolik (2009, 
2012), and Boix and Svolik (2013), all of whom explicitly modeled the collective 
action problems faced by the incumbent’s opponents. Unlike those authors, 
however, we focus on a democratic context in which the executive is subject to 
stringent formal rules and the status quo is biased against him or her, in the 
sense that if he/she cannot change the rules, he/she must step down at the end 
of his/her term. 
  Relaxing Term Limits in the Argentine Provinces, 1983–2017 53
 

 
It is at this second stage that supermajority constraints bite: if a 
proposal is approved by the appropriate (super)majority of legislators, 
the constitution is amended or, more commonly, the proposal moves to 
the ratification stage, where some additional player(s) – voters, the courts, a 
constituent assembly, or subnational legislatures – decide whether to 
ratify it.5 In other words, even if a supermajority of legislators supports a 
constitutional reform, voters may reject it, either by voting against it in a 
referendum (as happened in Venezuela in 2007; see Corrales and Pen-
fold-Becerra 2011) or by electing a constituent assembly in which oppo-
nents to the reform control a majority of seats (as in the Argentine prov-
ince of Misiones in 2006) (Ybarra 2006). 
Since our theoretical argument focuses on the interaction between 
the incumbent and the opposition in a collegiate body – be it a legislature 
or a constituent assembly – the appropriate test for the argument is 
whether such body behaves as expected by the theory, even if its deci-
sion is later rejected by voters. Thus, we deviate from the existing litera-
ture by examining constitutional reforms as a two-stage process (see 
Figure 1b). In our main analysis, we focus on the initiation and legislative 
stages, looking at whether the legislature approves a law mandating a 
constitutional reform; we then move to the ratification stage, examining 
whether the constituent assembly effectively relaxes term limits. We 
ignore voters’ decision to approve or reject a reform because our argu-
ment says nothing about their motivations.  
 
  
                                                 
5  Between 1960 and 2009, 80 percent of (national) reforms involving term limits 
were promulgated by either the legislature or a referendum (which were often 
preceded by a legislative decision; see Baturo 2014, Table 3.1). 
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Figure 1. The Process of Constitutional Reform 
(1a) The Steps of the Reform Process 
 
(1b) Alternative Research Designs 
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Note:  Panel (a) summarizes the main steps typically involved in most reform process-
es, distinguishing between the initiation stage, the legislative stage, the ratifica-
tion stage, and the final outcome. Panel (b) compares alternative research de-
signs for studying constitutional reforms. The shaded areas illustrate the ap-
proaches pursued in this paper: we first study the initiation and legislative stages 
of the reform process, and then examine the ratification stage in the constituent 
assembly. Compare with the approach followed by Baturo (2010, 2014) and 
Kouba (2016) (solid line); Corrales (2016) (dotted line); or Shugart (1998) and 
Negretto (2009, 2013) (broken line). 
 
As Figure 1b shows, our approach contrasts sharply with those favored 
by most of the literature. For example, Baturo (2010, 2014) and Kouba 
(2016) focused on whether the executive manages to relax term limits or 
not, regardless of the methods employed (see solid line); this offers the 
advantage of focusing on the final outcome, albeit at the expense of 
treating the reform process as a “black box.” Corrales, on the other 
hand, restricted his attention to those executives who openly manifested 
their interest in relaxing term limits (see dotted line), thus ignoring those 
presidents who did not announce their intention to relax term limits 
because they expected to fail (Corrales 2016: 17).6  
Finally, Shugart (1998) and Negretto (2009, 2013) only examined 
those constituent assemblies or legislatures that passed a constitutional 
amendment; that is, cases in which a reform had already been initiated 
(see broken line). Thus, these authors cannot explain when and why 
some executives manage to pass a constitutional reform through the 
legislature, nor can they say whether instances of non-initiation are sys-
tematically different from those in which the legislature actually initiated 
a reform. 
Empirically, we examine our argument in the context of the Argen-
tine provinces between 1983 and 2017. Since the mid-1980s, state gover-
nors in Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and, to a lesser extent, Venezuela, 
have become increasingly relevant political players (Calvo and Escolar 
2005; Calvo and Murillo 2005; Spiller and Tommasi 2007; Gervasoni 
2010; Bonvecchi and Lodola 2011; Samuels 2000; Samuels and Abrucio 
2000; Langston 2010; Rosas and Langston 2011; Albertus 2015). How-
ever, the institutional determinants of these increases in governors’ pow-
ers have received limited attention. In Brazil, Venezuela, and Mexico, 
subnational units have relatively little autonomy to design their own 
institutions; in particular, gubernatorial term limits are decided at the 
                                                 
6  This may explain why he found that a strong opposition has no effect on the 
president’s success at relaxing term limits: presidents who face a strong opposi-
tion may not attempt to relax term limits in the first place, as they know the at-
tempt would be politically costly but futile. 
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national level. In Argentina, by contrast, subnational authorities have 
wide discretion over these issues, which governors have taken advantage 
of to enhance their survival in office (see, for example, Calvo and 
Micozzi 2005 and Gervasoni 2010). Furthermore, by studying the Argen-
tine provinces we can exploit the fact that the rules governing constitu-
tional change are almost identical across districts, and the same applies to 
other institutions such as the rules for electing the governor or the length 
of the executive’s term. In a cross-national setting, by contrast, the com-
parative study of institutional change is often complicated by the fact 
that the rules governing such change vary widely between units and can-
not be summarized according to a common metric (Benoit 2007; Katz 
2005).  
The results are generally consistent with theoretical expectations. 
Across the entire sample (N = 208), the probability that the provincial 
legislature will initiate a reform process in a given two-year period is 0.14. 
If the governor’s party controls a supermajority of seats, this probability 
almost triples, to 0.40. But when the ruling party cannot impose a consti-
tutional reform unilaterally, the probability of relaxing term limits de-
pends on both the distribution of seats in the legislature and the electoral 
expectations of the opposition. If a single opposition party can veto a 
constitutional change, increasing the electoral expectations of the main 
opposition party across its interquartile range reduces the probability of 
reform from 0.22 to 0.12. When the opposition is fragmented, on the 
other hand, the probability of reform hovers between 0.17 and 0.25, 
although contrary to expectations this value is independent of the elec-
toral expectations of the largest opposition party. Furthermore, our ar-
gument also accounts for the behavior of constitutional assemblies in the 
ratification stage: all assemblies in which the governor’s party controlled 
a majority of seats relaxed term limits, while only those in which a single 
opposition party controlled an absolute majority kept them in place. The 
small sample size involved (N = 22) makes it difficult to determine 
whether this effect is conditioned by the electoral expectations of the 
opposition, although the coefficients have the expected sign. 
Theory: Explaining Constitutional Change 
Existing Literature 
When do incumbents relax term limits? Existing research has under-
scored the role of three factors: the value of staying in office, the institu-
tionalization of the ruling party, and the extent to which political power 
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is concentrated or fragmented among multiple players. According to the 
first argument, incumbents for whom the spoils of office are particularly 
large should be especially willing to introduce (consecutive) reelection.7 
Thus, the removal of term limits should be more common in poor, cor-
rupt and under-institutionalized countries, where politics rather than the 
private sector constitutes the main avenue for personal enrichment and a 
former ruler’s assets can be easily expropriated after he or she steps 
down (Baturo 2010, 2014). The second argument stresses that weakly 
institutionalized parties usually depend on the sitting executive for elec-
toral success, and are therefore more likely to be subject to his or her 
wishes. If the ruling party is highly institutionalized, in contrast, ambi-
tious executives are likely to face resistance from powerful copartisans 
who want to succeed them in office (Kouba 2016). 
The problem with these arguments is that they (implicitly) assume 
that as long as the executive or the ruling party back a constitutional 
reform, the opposition’s behavior is irrelevant. This is inconsistent with 
the fact that many incumbents failed to relax term limits. Moreover, if 
the opposition can veto a constitutional reform, increasing the value of 
office should decrease the probability of reform, as opposition leaders 
will be more motivated to capture the executive office for themselves. 
Empirically, ignoring the role of the opposition may also cast doubt on 
the interpretation of the results. For example, some measures of the 
executive’s willingness to remain in power might actually proxy for his/her 
capacity to remove term limits: a large public sector or a high risk of ex-
propriation certainly increase the stakes of office, but they also make it 
easier for the executive to bribe or threaten opposition legislators. Simi-
larly, weakly institutionalized parties may be more likely to capture the 
executive office when the entire political system – not just the ruling 
party – is weakly institutionalized. Outsider presidents like Fujimori, 
Chávez, or Correa, for example, took advantage of the collapse of tradi-
tional structures of representation to introduce sweeping constitutional 
changes shortly after assuming office.8 
                                                 
7  Term limits can take many forms: some executives are barred from running 
again forever; others must spend some period(s) out of office before running 
again; while others can remain in power for only two consecutive terms (Gins-
burg, Melton, and Elkins 2011). Since our focus is on consecutive reelection, we 
classify an incumbent as term-limited if he/she is legally barred from running in 
the next executive election. 
8  Additionally, this argument cannot explain why the same party – and some-
times even the same president – manages to relax term limits in some circum-
stances but not in others. Carlos Menem and Fernando Henrique Cardoso 
passed a constitutional reform relaxing term limits during their first term in of-
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Finally, the third argument emphasizes that executives who enjoy a 
power advantage over the opposition should be in a better position to 
relax term limits (Corrales 2016). More specifically, power-concentrating 
institutional reforms – such as a more powerful executive or a majoritar-
ian electoral system – should be more likely when (a) a single player can 
modify the relevant legislation unilaterally, and (b) this player expects to 
remain in office in the future. However, if an institutional reform re-
quires the agreement of multiple players, or the most powerful player 
expects to lose the next election, institutional reforms should be power-
sharing, such as a proportional electoral system or an independent judici-
ary (Elster 1995; Boix 1999; Benoit 2004; Finkel 2005; Negretto 2006, 
2009, 2013; Ferejohn, Rosenbluth, and Shipan 2007; Leiras, Giraudy, and 
Tuñón 2015). While this argument does recognize the role of the opposi-
tion in the reform process, it cannot explain why some incumbents man-
age to relax term limits when their party does not control enough seats 
to change the constitution unilaterally. Acknowledging this fact, some 
authors have argued that these changes are possible because of a “grand 
bargain” between the executive and the opposition; for example, opposi-
tion leaders might let the incumbent run for reelection in exchange for a 
more proportional electoral system or an independent judiciary (Negret-
to 2013; Almaraz 2010). However, this begs the question of what condi-
tions facilitate (or hinder) such agreements: Why are some opposition 
leaders more willing to strike such bargains than others? 
The Bargaining between Government and  
Opposition 
Our argument builds upon this last strand of the literature, but introduc-
ing two crucial differences: we pay more attention to who is fragmented 
and whose expectations matter. While a fragmented political system might 
lead to power-sharing institutions, a fragmented opposition can facilitate 
the introduction of power-concentrating reforms. Similarly, when the 
opposition can veto a constitutional reform, it is the opposition’s expecta-
tions that matter: opposition parties that expect to win the next executive 
election will be more reluctant to let the sitting executive run for a new 
term than those that expect to lose anyway. 
More specifically, we think of the constitutional reform process as a 
bargaining game between a term-limited executive – whom we also call 
                                                                                                    
fice but not the second, despite no obvious changes in their parties’ level of in-
stitutionalization.  
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“the incumbent” – and one or more opposition parties. Removing term 
limits requires the support of a supermajority of legislators. We assume 
that individual executives running for reelection enjoy an electoral ad-
vantage above and beyond what their parties can command, and that the 
executive office is the most valuable political position in the polity. 
These assumptions imply that, other things equal, opposition leaders will 
prefer to keep term limits in place, thus maximizing their own chances of 
capturing the executive office in the future, even though their capacity to 
achieve such an outcome may vary. Both assumptions are reasonable in 
Latin America, either at the national level (the presidency is often the 
most highly coveted political office) or at the subnational one, especially 
in federal countries like Argentina, Brazil, or Mexico, where governors 
control substantial resources, preside over large patronage machines, 
enjoy widespread name recognition, and exert substantial influence over 
their copartisans’ careers (Calvo and Murillo 2004, 2005; Spiller and 
Tommasi 2007; Bonvecchi and Lodola 2011; Schiumerini and Page 2012; 
Ames 2001; Samuels and Abrucio 2000; Samuels 2000, 2003; Langston 
2010; Rosas and Langston 2011; Magar 2012).  
The supermajority requirement implies that players might find 
themselves in one of three mutually exclusive scenarios. In a supermajority 
scenario, the party of the sitting executive controls enough seats to ap-
prove a constitutional reform regardless of what the opposition does. In 
other words, the opposition is irrelevant, which makes a reform particu-
larly likely. Thus, when Hugo Chávez sought to scrap term limits alto-
gether, the fact that his party controlled almost all seats in the National 
Assembly – the opposition had boycotted the previous election – greatly 
facilitated legislative passage.9 Similarly, in the Argentine provinces of 
Salta (1997, 2003) or San Juan (2011), the ruling party could pass a con-
stitutional reform despite the opposition’s strenuous but sterile protests 
(see Lucardi 2006 and Ámbito Financiero 2011, respectively). This suggests 
the following hypothesis: 
H1. Supermajority. A constitutional reform should be more likely 
when the executive’s party controls a supermajority of seats in 
the legislature. 
Of course, this “constitutional sweet spot” (from the incumbent’s per-
spective) is rare in practice. Ambitious incumbents must usually seek an 
agreement with the opposition, the feasibility of which depends on the 
                                                 
9  Voters initially rejected the proposal in the 2007 referendum, but they were 
more supportive two years later, when Chávez insisted with a similar project 
(Corrales and Penfold-Becerra 2011). 
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electoral strength of the largest opposition party. In a single party veto sce-
nario, a single opposition party can block a constitutional reform, which 
means that the incumbent must reach a mutually satisfactory agreement 
with that party’s leader(s). Since the incumbent needs opposition support 
to accomplish his or her reform project, he/she has obvious incentives 
to offer some valuable compensation in return. However, the prefer-
ences of the opposition party are less clear: while its leader(s) value the 
compensation payments that the incumbent can offer, they also know 
that relaxing term limits will decrease their chances of capturing the 
executive in the upcoming election.10 
Thus, the opposition’s choice will depend on the relative im-
portance of three factors: (a) the generosity of the compensation pay-
ment(s) offered by the incumbent; (b) the value of controlling the execu-
tive; and (c) its probability of winning the next executive election. In 
general, it makes sense to assume that (b) will be much larger than (a), 
not only because the executive is the most valuable office in the polity, 
but also because the incumbent will not be interested in offering conces-
sions that trump the value of the executive office. However, the extent 
to which the opposition can expect to win the next executive election 
can vary substantially. This implies that the electoral expectations of the 
opposition should play a key role in determining whether an agreement 
can be reached. Simply put, opposition parties that do not expect to do 
well in the upcoming election will be willing to accept the incumbent’s 
offer and agree to relax term limits, while those with good chances of 
winning office in the future will fight tooth and nail to block the incum-
bent’s reelection drive. 
The Argentine constitutional reform of 1994 offers a good example 
of this. Since his party was 40 deputies short of the two-thirds majority 
required to enact a constitutional change, President Carlos Menem’s 
reelection project depended on the support of the main opposition party, 
the Unión Cívica Radical (UCR).11 Thus, Menem adopted a two-pronged 
strategy. On the one hand, he called a (nonbinding) plebiscite to exploit 
                                                 
10  The same reasoning holds if they believe that voters will interpret an agreement 
as a sellout and punish them at the polls. We thank Marcelo Nazareno for sug-
gesting this interpretation. 
11  Technically, the UCR was two deputies short of the 86 required to veto a 
constitutional reform. But if the UCR voted against the reform, Menem would 
have needed the support of almost all other legislators, some of whom be-
longed to small left-wing parties that strongly opposed his government. That is, 
the transaction cost of negotiating with all other opposition deputies was so 
high that for practical purposes the UCR can be considered a veto player. 
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the UCR’s unpopularity with voters.12 On the other hand, he proved 
willing to introduce institutional reforms that the UCR valued, such as 
eliminating the electoral college, shortening the presidential term, or 
placing formal limits on the president’s decree authority. Eventually, an 
agreement was reached and Menem was able to seek reelection in 1995 
(Acuña 1995; Negretto 2013: ch. 5). This suggests the following hypoth-
esis: 
H2. Expectations. If the incumbent party does not control a su-
permajority of seats, a reform should be less likely as the elec-
toral expectations of the opposition become more optimistic. 
Finally, in a fragmented opposition scenario, the ruling party does not control 
a supermajority of seats, but no opposition party can veto a reform sin-
gle-handedly. That is, the incumbent needs opposition support, but no 
single opposition party is indispensable. If A will vote against the reform 
no matter what, the executive may get what he/she wants by reaching an 
agreement with B. Thus, in addition to the previous considerations, op-
position leaders must also consider what other opposition parties are 
likely to do. Intuitively, if the executive reaches an agreement with A but 
not with B, then B will pay the cost of running against an incumbent 
seeking reelection, but without having received any compensation pay-
ment(s) in return. This allows the executive to play a “divide-and-rule” 
strategy, taking advantage of each opposition party’s fear that the other 
will try to negotiate a better deal. Of course, opposition leaders under-
stand this and may seek to negotiate jointly with the executive, but the 
credibility of such an agreement cannot be taken for granted. The impli-
cation is that when the opposition is fragmented, its electoral expecta-
tions should also matter for the probability of reform, but to a lesser 
extent than if a single opposition party can veto a constitutional change. 
The constitutional reform in the Argentine province of La Pampa 
(1994) follows this script almost perfectly. Governor Rubén Marín was 
term-limited and his party was a few deputies short of the two-thirds 
majority required to approve a constitutional reform. The two opposi-
tion parties with legislative representation – the UCR and Convocatoria 
Independiente (CI), a small provincial party – opposed the governor’s 
reform project, but neither could veto it single-handedly. Thus, Marín 
threatened to replace the PR electoral system then in place with a majori-
tarian arrangement. This would have been disastrous for CI, the smallest 
                                                 
12  The UCR was discredited for its mismanagement of the economy during the 
1980s. In the 1993 legislative election it received 30 percent of the vote, and in 
1995 its presidential candidate would hit a record low of 17 percent. 
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opposition party, and since changing the electoral rules required a simple 
majority of seats, the governor’s threat was credible. Therefore, CI 
agreed to support Marín’s reelection bid if the PR system was enshrined 
in the constitution, ensuring that it could not be changed by a simple 
majority in the future. After the agreement became known, the UCR 
dropped its opposition to the governor’s reelection in exchange for a 
voice in the reform process (Micozzi 2001). Similarly, during the 1994 
constituent assembly in the province of Buenos Aires, Governor Edu-
ardo Duhalde took advantage of a fragmented opposition to reach an 
agreement with the right-wing Modín party. In exchange for a constitu-
tional clause banning abortion, the latter agreed to a referendum that 
would allow Duhalde to run for reelection (Lucardi 2006). Thus, our 
final hypothesis is as follows: 
H3. Fragmented opposition. The effect of the expectations of the 
opposition should be weaker when no single opposition party 
can veto a constitutional reform. 
Discussion 
Despite its simplicity, the above argument highlights two important 
aspects of constitutional reform processes that have been ignored by the 
existing literature. On the one hand, it puts the incentives and opportuni-
ties faced by opposition parties at the forefront. On the other, rather 
than simply looking at the proportion of seats controlled by the opposi-
tion, it emphasizes the qualitative difference between a scenario in which 
the opposition is irrelevant, one in which a single opposition party can 
veto a reform, and another where the opposition is fragmented.13  
The assumptions behind the argument are also consistent with what 
we know about Argentine provincial politics. In line with the claim that 
the executive is the most valuable political office at the provincial level, 
Argentine governors are widely perceived as the most powerful players 
in the country after the president: they have access to valuable resources, 
control powerful political machines, and exert a strong influence on the 
political careers of their copartisans (Jones 1997; De Luca, Jones, and 
Tula 2002; Calvo and Murillo 2004, 2005; Spiller and Tommasi 2007; 
                                                 
13  The point is not trivial because if, say, a constitutional reform must be initiated 
by a two-thirds majority of the legislature, then increasing the incumbent par-
ty’s seat share from 2/3 minus one seat to 2/3 is much more relevant than in-
creasing it from 3/5 minus one seat to 3/5, even though in both cases there is a 
one-seat change. 
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Gervasoni 2010; Bonvecchi and Lodola 2011; Schiumerini and Page 
2012). This means that governors have multiple bargaining tools with 
which to induce the opposition to cooperate, including policy conces-
sions, money for political campaigns, or financial transfers to the munic-
ipalities controlled by opposition mayors. Indeed, in some provinces the 
opposition even begs for funds from the governor himself. Former Na-
tional Senator Sergio Mansilla of Tucumán – a close ally of Governor 
José Alperovich (2003–2015) – once boasted that “99 percent” of the 
opposition begged for funds during the 2009 electoral campaign: 
We financed the [electoral] campaign of many of them. Whoever 
wanted to be a candidate needed something from us. The more 
divided the opposition, the better for us. [...] Everybody stepped 
into [the governor’s mansion]. Masso (Federico, Libres del Sur), 
Bussi, everybody. Some went to the personal office of José [Alpe-
rovich], others used the elevator, others, the stairs. Cirnigliaro 
(Renzo, Partido Laborista) did not go to the governor’s mansion 
but to the Legislature, which is the same. (Balinotti and Sbrocco 
2011: 74–75; our translation)14 
Unsurprisingly, while Alperovich first won the governorship in 2003 
with 44.4 percent of the vote thanks to a divided opposition, in 2007 and 
2011 he would be reelected with massive popular support – 78.2 and 
69.9 percent, respectively. A further implication of this logic is that indi-
vidual governors are often perceived, rightly or wrongly, as enjoying a 
personal incumbency advantage when running for reelection, either due to 
superior name recognition or because they are better at keeping their 
party together (De Luca, Jones, and Tula 2002). Between 1987 and 2015, 
the incumbent party retained the governorship 77.6 percent of the time 
(in 142 out of 183 cases), but the rate was 9.4 percentage points higher 
when the executive could stand for reelection (82.1 percent) than if he or 
she was term-limited (72.7 percent).15 This high rate of incumbent sur-
                                                 
14  “A varios les bancamos la campaña. El que quería ser candidato, algo quería de 
nosotros. A más dividida la oposición, mejor para nosotros. [...] Pasaron todos. 
Masso (Federico, Libres del Sur), Bussi, todos. Algunos pasaban por la oficina 
de José, otros entraban por el ascensor, otros, por la escalera. Cirnigliaro (Ren-
zo, Partido Laborista) no pasó por la gobernación pero sí por la Legislatura, 
que es lo mismo.” 
15  A one-sided t-test indicates that this difference is statistically significant at the 
7.5 percent level. Unfortunately, the fact that there are very few close guberna-
torial election in Argentina precludes us from employing a regression disconti-
nuity design to determine whether this effect is causal (though see Schiumerini 
and Page 2012). 
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vival explains why the opposition would prefer the sitting governor not 
to stand for reelection, as well as why opposition parties that expect to 
do well in the next executive election may be reluctant to support a con-
stitutional reform. 
Finally, it may be argued that the constitutional reforms studied in 
this paper often encompassed multiple issues besides term limits. While 
true, this does not disprove the point that executive reelection was the 
main driving force behind most of such reforms. On the one hand, gov-
ernors who were not interested in relaxing term limits could have easily 
excluded them from the issues under consideration.16 Tellingly, few of 
them did so, and many of the exceptions prove the rule: for example, the 
constitutional reforms of Córdoba (2001) and Neuquén (2004), which 
introduced major changes but excepted the term limits clause, took place 
many years after executive reelection (for a single additional term) had 
been introduced. Similarly, in Entre Ríos both governors Sergio Montiel 
(UCR) and Jorge Busti (PJ) promoted a constitutional reform that would 
relax term limits in order to run for another term (Muñoz Paupie 2001); 
it was only after these attempts had failed that Busti agreed to promote a 
constitutional reform relaxing term limits, but without benefitting him-
self from it.17 In contrast, in most of the case studies listed in Table 1, 
things were quite different: the governor first announced his intention to 
change the constitution, to which the opposition replied that the incum-
bent only wanted to perpetuate himself in power; the governor denied 
that strongly, but ensured that the timing of the reform allowed him to 
run for another term. 
Furthermore, it is precisely because constitutional reforms are mul-
tidimensional in nature that the incumbent and the opposition can reach 
a mutually satisfactory agreement, relaxing term limits in exchange for 
some institutional changes preferred by the opposition. Besides the case 
of La Pampa and Buenos Aires discussed above, these agreements were 
quite common in the Argentine provinces (Almaraz 2010). As Table 1 
shows, in 8 of the 30 instances of reform included in our dataset (26.7 
percent), the governor’s party controlled a supermajority of seats in the 
provincial legislature, implying that an agreement with the opposition 
was not necessary. In 12 of the remaining 22 instances (54.6 percent), 
case studies indicate that the main opposition party played a role in de-
                                                 
16  Reform laws amending the constitution or calling a constituent assembly can 
specify which constitutional clauses may be amended, thus making it straight-
forward to leave term limits outside the scope of the reform. 
17  Elections for the constituent assembly were held on the same day as Busti’s 
successor was chosen. 
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termining both the content and extent of the reform, while in 4 other 
cases (18.2 percent), the opposition as a whole did not support the re-
form, but the acquiescence of some opposition legislators was indispen-
sable for changing the constitution – raising the possibility that there was 
some kind of compensation “under the table.” While we lack infor-
mation for the remaining six cases, the data clearly shows that governors 
who needed opposition support to pass a reform in the legislature usual-
ly offered something in return, which is entirely consistent with our ar-
gument. 
Table 1.  Constitutional Reforms Involving Term Limits Approved by Argen-
tine Provincial Legislatures, 1983–2017 
Province Year Super-
majority
Bargain-
ing 
Defec-
tions 
Source 
Buenos 
Aires 1989 0 1 0 Lucardi (2006) 
Buenos 
Aires 1993 0 1 0 Lucardi (2006) 
Catamarca 1988 0 0 1 Carrera (2001) 
Chaco 1993 0 1 0 Micozzi (2001) 
Chubut 1993 0 1 0 Micozzi (2001) 
Córdoba 1986 1 0 0 Koessl (2000) 
Corrientes 2006 0 N/D N/D  
Formosa 1988 0 N/D N/D  
Formosa 2002 1 0 0  
Jujuy 1985 0 1 0 Carrera (2001) 
La Pampa 1993 0 1 0 Micozzi (2001) 
La Pampa 1998 0 0 1 Micozzi (2001) 
La Rioja 1985 1 0 0  
Mendoza 2001 0 1 0 Los Andes, 23 April 2001 
Misiones 1988 0 N/D N/D  
Misiones 2006 0 0 1 La Nación, 1 July 2006 
Neuquén 1993 0 N/D N/D  
Río Ne-
gro 1986 0 N/D N/D  
Salta 1984 0 1 0 Lucardi (2006) 
Salta 1997 1 0 0 Lucardi (2006) 
Salta 2003 1 0 0 Lucardi (2006) 
San Juan 1985 1 0 0 Russo (2001) 
San Juan 2011 1 0 0  
San Luis 1986 0 1 0  
Santa 
Cruz 1993 0 1 0 Fuertes (2000) 
Santiago 1985 1 0 0 Fuertes (2000) 
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Province Year Super-
majority
Bargain-
ing 
Defec-
tions 
Source 
Santiago 1997 0 0 1 Fuertes (2000) 
Tucumán 1988 0 1 0 Suárez Cao (2000) 
Tucumán 2002 0 N/D N/D  
Tucumán 2004 0 1 0 La Gaceta, 23 Dec. 2004 
 total 8 12 4  
Note:  Only constitutional reforms that would have allowed the governor to run for a 
new consecutive term are included (see Table A1 in the Appendix for a full list 
of constitutional reform laws). Year indicates the year in which the provincial 
legislature approved the constitutional reform law mandating the reform; this 
may not coincide with the year in which the reform was effectively implement-
ed. Supermajority indicates whether the governor’s party controlled a super-
majority of seats in all chambers of the provincial legislature. Bargaining indi-
cates whether the sources mention that the constitutional reform law resulted 
from an explicit agreement between the governor, his/her party and some op-
position party (or parties). Defections indicates whether the reform law was 
explicitly supported by some opposition legislators who deviated from their par-
ty’s anti-reform stance. 
Statistical Analysis 
These considerations demonstrate the plausibility of the argument and 
show that unless the governor’s party controlled a supermajority of seats, 
most constitutional reforms required an agreement with the opposition. 
However, a more systematic examination of our argument requires us to 
show that such reforms were indeed more likely when the opposition 
had stronger incentives to negotiate with the governor. To do this, we 
evaluate our hypotheses with data on the Argentine provinces between 
1983 and 2017. Like the US states, the Argentine provinces enjoy a sub-
stantial degree of autonomy for designing local institutions, including 
executive term limits. When Argentina returned to democracy in 1983, 
no provincial governor could stand for reelection at the end of his or her 
term, but by 2017 this restriction only remains in place in two districts. 
Moreover, as Table 1 shows, the timing of these reforms differed sub-
stantially between provinces – some introduced executive reelection as 
early as 1986, while others waited until 2011 –, and some provincial 
legislatures initiated multiple reforms. At the same time, other provincial 
institutions display relatively little variation: all provinces have a presi-
dential system, all gubernatorial terms last four years, most provincial 
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executives are directly elected by plurality rule,18 and constitutional 
changes require the approval of a two-thirds majority of (both chambers 
of) the provincial legislature.19 Moreover, the fact that the country’s two 
main national parties, the PJ and the UCR, tend to be dominant at the 
provincial level as well means that differences in party institutionalization 
(Kouba 2016) are unlikely to account for the timing of constitutional 
reform within provinces. 
As indicated in Figure 1b, the analysis is divided into two parts. We 
first examine the legislative stage of the reform process, with the goal of 
identifying when a provincial legislature will pass a constitutional 
amendment or approve a special law calling for a constituent assembly. 
In this case, the unit of observation is the province-biennium; that is, we 
divide each four-year gubernatorial term into two two-year periods, treat-
ing each as a separate observation. We do not use entire gubernatorial 
periods because several provinces hold midterm elections, which might 
alter the composition of the provincial legislature.20 This yields up to 16 
observations per province,21 though the actual number is usually lower. 
Since we are interested in those governors who may have wanted to 
change the provincial constitution in order to run for another term, we 
exclude all observations in which the governor faced no term limits at 
the beginning of the biennium.22 We also restrict the sample to elected 
governors who remained in office for at least half of the two-year peri-
                                                 
18  Three provinces had an electoral college until 1993, and four use some kind of 
runoff system. The rest employ simple plurality rule. 
19  Provincial constitutions can be changed in two ways: (a) through a constituent 
assembly specifically called for that purpose; or (b) via a legislative amendment 
that voters must ratify in a referendum. In both cases, the reform must be initi-
ated by a supermajority of at least two-thirds of (each chamber of) the provin-
cial legislature. 
20  Keeping two-year periods for provinces with midterm elections and four-year 
periods for provinces without them would assign undue influence to the for-
mer. Using weights would just reproduce the logic that is already in our data. In 
any case, note that our approach is not fundamentally different from the usual 
practice of treating the country-year as the unit of observation. 
21  For each province, we collected data between 1983 (or the first year there was 
an elected governor) and 2015. We exclude the 2015–2017 period because gov-
ernors elected in 2015 may still change the provincial constitution before 2019. 
The exceptions are Corrientes and Santiago del Estero, where we collected data 
for 2015–2017 because the current governor’s mandate ends that year. 
22  In most provinces, the governor can serve no more than two consecutive 
terms; whenever this is the case, reelected governors are included in the analy-
sis. 
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od;23 acting vice-governors and interim governors are weaker political 
players, which makes them unlikely to initiate a reform process. These 
factors explain why the main sample contains 208 observations instead 
of the approximately 380 that would be the case if all two-year periods 
were included.24 We then move to the ratification stage, examining a con-
stituent assembly’s choice between introducing reelection and keeping 
term limits in place (see Figure 1b). In this case, we employ a sample of 
22 constituent assemblies that followed from the initiation decisions 
examined in the first analysis (see Table A2 in the appendix for a list).25 
Variables 
In the main analysis the outcome is Legislative initiation, a dummy that 
takes the value of 1 if the provincial legislature (a) passed a law calling for 
a constitutional reform that (b) would have allowed the sitting governor 
to stand for reelection at the end of his or her term.26 A total of 30 such 
                                                 
23  Thus, we lose one observation that ended in a constitutional reform (Catamarca 
1988, where the vice-governor did not benefit directly from the reform). 
24  To understand how we constructed the sample, consider the province of For-
mosa. Governor Floro Bogado was term-limited throughout his term; there-
fore, his two biennia in office (1983–1985 and 1985–1987) are included in the 
sample. His successor, Vicente Joga, began his mandate with term limits, but 
managed to pass a constitutional reform law through the legislature in 1988; 
therefore, the 1987–1989 period is included in the sample, but the 1989–1991 
one is not because a reform was already under way. Joga was reelected in 1991, 
but the constitution barred him from running again, so the 1991–1993 and 
1993–1995 periods are included in the sample. Joga’s successor, Gildo Insfrán, 
was not term-limited during his first mandate, so the corresponding periods 
(1995–1997 and 1997–1999) are not included in the analysis. After getting re-
elected in 1999, Insfrán was originally barred from running for a third term, so 
the 1999–2001 and 2001–2003 periods are included in the analysis. In 2003, 
however, unlimited reelection was adopted; therefore, since 2003-2005 all ob-
servations from Formosa have been dropped from the sample. 
25  Data on the 1991 Formosan assembly is missing and in other six cases there 
was no constituent assembly because the legislature passed an amendment that 
had to be ratified directly by voters (Misiones 1988, Buenos Aires 1990, 
Neuquén 1994, San Juan 2011); the decision to call an assembly was rejected in 
a referendum (Mendoza 2001); or the governor opted not to call the assembly 
due to his unpopularity (Tucumán 2002). 
26  That is, only reforms that passed through the provincial legislature are taken 
into account; cases in which the governor was able to stand for reelection due 
to a judicial ruling are coded as zero because governors only resort to such tac-
tics when they are unable to muster enough legislative support.  
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reforms were initiated between 1983 and 2017 (see Table 1);27 this ex-
ceeds the number of provinces (24) because some reform attempts end-
ed in failure, and some provinces relaxed term limits more than once. In 
the second analysis, the dependent variable is Reelection, a dummy that 
takes the value of 1 if the constituent assembly introduced a clause allow-
ing the sitting executive to run for reelection at the end of his or her 
term.28 Approximately 80 percent of assemblies (17 of 22) allowed the 
governor to run for a new term.29 
According to the argument, the probability of reform depends on 
two factors: the distribution of seats in the provincial legislature and the 
electoral expectations of the main opposition party. We capture the first 
with two dummies. (Super)majority takes the value of 1 if the governor’s 
party controlled enough seats to initiate (or approve) a constitutional 
reform unilaterally. In the main analysis, this corresponds to a two-thirds 
majority in (both chambers of) the provincial legislature; in the ratifica-
tion analysis, it codes whether the ruling party controlled an absolute 
majority of seats in the constituent assembly. Single party veto takes the 
value of 1 when the main opposition party could veto a reform by it-
self.30 This corresponds to more than one-third of the seats in (at least 
one chamber of) the provincial legislature, or to half of the seats in a 
constituent assembly. Both variables are measured immediately after the 
last provincial legislative election.31 When both (Super)majority and Single 
party veto equal zero, it means that the ruling party cannot impose a con-
stitutional change unilaterally, but the opposition is so fragmented that 
no party can veto a reform by itself.32 Given our theoretical argument, 
we define the main opposition party as the opposition party that controls 
the largest delegation (“bloque”) in the lower chamber of the provincial 
                                                 
27  However, only 29 such cases are included in the analysis (see fn. 23). 
28  Perfect separation between the explanatory variables and the outcome pre-
cludes the use of an ordinal variable with three categories (no reelection, limited 
reelection, unlimited reelection): only assemblies where the governor’s party 
controlled an absolute majority of seats introduced unlimited reelection, while 
the no-reelection clause was only kept in place if the governor’s party lacked 
such a majority. 
29  Data for constructing these variables comes from La Ley Online, a database of 
Argentine legislation (<www.laleyonline.com.ar/>), and several provincial leg-
islative websites. 
30  The main sources for these variables are Ministerio del Interior (2008, 2012) 
and Tow (2017). 
31  If the ley de lemas was employed, we aggregate seats at the level of the party or 
lema rather than the sublemas. 
32  Notice that (Super)majority = 1 implies Single party veto = 0, and vice versa. 
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legislature (or the constituent assembly, when applicable); that is, the 
party that was in the best position to block the incumbent’s re-election 
drive. The main opposition party is often the runner-up in the previous 
gubernatorial election, although this is not necessarily the case; for ex-
ample, because of midterm elections. The distribution of seats some-
times changes due to party switching, but we ignored this possibility 
both due to data limitations – information on official party blocs is not 
readily available – and because party switching may be endogenous to a 
governor’s reform attempt(s); however, we do take into account seat 
changes resulting from midterm elections.  
Operationalizing the expectations of the opposition is trickier be-
cause survey data is either unavailable or nonexistent for most provinces. 
We thus employ electoral data, under the assumption that past electoral 
results provide opposition leaders with information about their future 
electoral prospects. Thus, Expectations is defined as the vote share of the 
main opposition party in the last gubernatorial election that had taken 
place in the province. This variable is certainly correlated with Single party 
veto,33 but the two are not equivalent: electoral rules are often biased in 
favor of the incumbent party (Calvo and Micozzi 2005), and the fact that 
several provinces hold midterm elections means that the composition of 
the provincial legislature is not entirely determined in years with guber-
natorial elections. Indeed, Figure 2c shows that Expectations can vary 
substantially even when Single party veto is equal to one. In any case, in 
some specifications we also measure Expectations as the average vote 
share of the main opposition party in the two previous executive elec-
tions. 
We also include the following controls. Reelected governor is a dummy 
that takes the value of 1 if the sitting executive was not serving her first 
consecutive term in office. To the extent that a third consecutive term is 
more difficult to defend in public than a second one, this variable should 
have a negative effect on the probability of reform. National reform is a 
dummy that takes the value of 1 for the 1991–1995 period; it accounts 
for potential contagion effects from the national constitutional reform of 
1994. National transfers indicates the amount of revenues per capita that 
the province received from the national government, averaged over four 
years. More revenues both make the governorship more attractive and 
increase the governor’s capacity to compensate the opposition (Gerva-
soni 2010). We also include a dummy indicating whether a province had 
a Bicameral legislature, which may make it more difficult to pass a constitu-
                                                 
33  The correlation coefficient is 0.49, with a 95 percent C.I. of [0.38:0.59]. 
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tional reform. Party institutionalization, partisan cultures, and the struc-
ture of party organizations can also affect the probability of reform. In 
particular, decentralized parties might be easier to co-opt while in oppo-
sition, but more difficult to discipline while in government (Shugart 
1998; VonDoepp 2005; Negretto 2009), while weakly institutionalized 
parties may be more solidly unified behind the executive (Kouba 2016). 
Thus, we control for the identity of the Incumbent party and the main 
Opposition party, both of which are factors with three categories: PJ (Par-
tido Justicialista), UCR (Unión Cívica Radical), and Other.34 There is wide-
spread consensus that the PJ and third parties are less institutionalized 
than the UCR (Levitsky 2001; De Luca, Jones, and Tula 2002). 
Specification 
For the main analysis, we fit random effects probit models of the form 
 
Pr (Yjt = 1)   =  (j + S · Sjt + V · Vjt + E · Ejt + VE · Vjt · Ejt +  · Cjt) 
j    ~ N (, 2), 
 
where Pr (Yjt = 1) is the probability that a constitutional reform law will 
be approved in province j in period t; (·) is the normal CDF; j is a 
random intercept that varies by province; Sjt and Vjt stand for Supermajori-
ty and Single party veto, respectively; Ejt indicates the Expectations of the 
opposition; and Cjt is a vector of controls. The random effects account 
for the possibility that observations belonging to the same province may 
be similar to each other. The interpretation of the results follows directly 
from the hypotheses. The supermajority hypothesis predicts S > 0; that 
is, the probability of reform should increase when the governor’s party 
controls a supermajority of seats. According to the expectations hypoth-
esis, a more optimistic opposition should be less likely to acquiesce to a 
reform, implying E < 0. Finally, the fragmented opposition hypothesis 
predicts VE < 0: when a single opposition party can veto a reform, the 
negative effect of Expectations should be larger in magnitude. 
  
                                                 
34  These variables come from Rulers (2017); Tow (2017); Ministerio de Economía 
(2011); and Ruiz (2012). 
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Figure 2. Distribution of Legislative initiation, Conditional on the Expecta-
tions of the Main Opposition Party, under Different Scenarios 
 
 
 
Note:  Solid dots denote governors in their first (consecutive) term in office, while 
open dots indicate governors who had already been reelected. 
When examining the behavior of constitutional conventions, we intro-
duce two important differences. Since most provinces held a single con-
stituent assembly, we get rid of the random intercepts. Furthermore, 
perfect separation between Majority and Reelection – all constitutional 
reforms in which the incumbent party controlled a majority of seats 
relaxed term limits – precludes the use of generalized linear models, so 
we fit linear probability models, which are immune to this problem. 
Results 
Initiating Constitutional Reforms 
Since we are estimating a complex model with a relatively small sample, 
some readers might wonder whether our findings constitute a statistical 
artifact rather than a feature of the data. To alleviate these concerns, in 
Figure 2 we plot the distribution of Legislative initiation, conditional on 
Expectations, for each of the three scenarios considered by the argument. 
Prima facie, the data seems consistent with our hypotheses. Figure 2a 
shows that whenever the governor’s party controls a supermajority of 
seats, reform is very likely. Figure 2b indicates that when the opposition 
is fragmented, the probability of reform does not seem to depend on 
Expectations. This runs counter to the expectations hypothesis, but many 
of these observations correspond to reelected governors, who might be 
less likely to pass a reform for other reasons. Finally, Figure 2c shows 
that when a single opposition party can veto a reform, Expectations seems 
negatively related to the outcome, and the relationship is not being driv-
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en by observations with abnormally low values of this variable: most 
observations are located along the [0.20:0.50] range, but instances of 
initiation are overwhelmingly concentrated in the [0.20:0.40] interval. 
Table 2a explores whether these patterns persist after taking into 
account both province effects and multiple variables simultaneously. 
Model 1 only includes Supermajority, Single party veto, Expectations, and the 
interaction between the last two as explanatory variables. Model 2, which 
is our preferred specification, adds a dummy indicating whether the 
governor had already been reelected. In model 3 we measure Expectations 
as the average gubernatorial vote share of the main opposition party in 
the last two elections held in the province.35 Models 4 to 7 replicate 
model 2, but add controls for National reform, National transfers, Bicameral 
legislature, and the identity of the incumbent and opposition parties, re-
spectively. In line with Figure 2, we find support for the supermajority 
and fragmentation hypotheses. First, the point estimates for Supermajority 
are always positive and precisely estimated. Second, and contrary to the 
expectations hypothesis, the point estimates for Expectations are positive, 
although the large standard errors mean that we cannot reject the claim 
that the actual effect might be zero. Finally, and in line with the claim 
that the expectations of the opposition are more relevant when a single 
party can veto a constitutional reform, the interaction between Single 
party veto and Expectations is negative and large in magnitude across all 
models; due to the small sample size, however, the estimates are only 
significant at the 0.10 level. Furthermore, the interaction term is much 
larger in magnitude than the estimate for Expectations, which indicates 
that when the opposition is unified the net effect of this variable is nega-
tive. This holds even if we measure Expectations as the average vote share 
of the main opposition party in the last two gubernatorial elections that 
took place in the province (see model 3). The controls often have the 
expected sign (positive for National reform and National transfers; negative 
for Reelected governor and Bicameral legislature), but only the point estimates 
for Reelected governor and Bicameral legislature are substantial in magnitude 
and reliably estimated. 
  
                                                 
35  When there was a single previous election – for example, between 1983 and 
1987, or when the main opposition party had just been established – we use the 
value of the last election only. 
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Table 2. Constitutional Reforms in the Argentine Provinces, 1983–2017 
 (a) Outcome is Legislative initiation  
(random effects probit) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
(Super)majority (S) 0.86 0.98 1.00 1.01 
 (0.34) (0.36) (0.36) (0.36) 
Single party veto (V) 2.08 1.45 1.42 1.34 
 (0.89) (0.94) (1.05) (0.95) 
Expectations (E) 3.32 2.04 2.86 1.79 
 (1.65) (1.80) (1.94) (1.82) 
Veto x Expectations (VE) -6.19 -4.78 -4.61 -4.47 
 (2.51) (2.65) (2.84) (2.69) 
Reelected governor  -0.80 -0.81 -0.78 
  (0.31) (0.31) (0.31) 
National reform    0.26 
    (0.31) 
National transfers (log)     
     
Bicameral legislature     
     
Incumbent party: PJ     
     
Incumbent party: UCR     
     
Opposition party: PJ     
     
Opposition party: UCR     
     
Intercept -2.21 -1.52 -1.84 -1.49 
 (0.54) (0.61) (0.70) (0.61) 
AIC 166.0 160.5 160.6 161.8 
BIC 186.0 183.8 184.0 188.5 
log-Likelihood -77.0 -73.2 -73.3 -72.9 
Deviance 154.0 146.4 146.6 145.8 
num. observations 208 208 208 208 
num. provinces 24 24 24 24 
num. successes 29 29 29 29 
Provincial variance (2) 0 0 0 0 
Residual variance 1 1 1 1 
Note:  Standard errors in parentheses. Panel (a): Main analysis. The outcome is  
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Table 2. (continued) 
(a) Outcome is Legislative initiation
(random effects probit) 
(b) Outcome is Reelection  
(linear probability model) 
(5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
1.00 1.05 0.93 0.33 0.35 0.34 
(0.38) (0.36) (0.37) (0.17) (0.17) (0.18) 
1.60 1.64 1.54 -0.42 0.51 0.52 
(0.99) (0.96) (0.97) (0.21) (0.77) (0.83) 
1.77 1.87 2.32  0.30 0.30 
(2.01) (1.81) (2.03)  (0.58) (0.61) 
-5.05 -5.00 -5.03  -3.52 -3.56 
(2.82) (2.69) (2.77)  (2.85) (3.14) 
-0.74 -0.97 -0.83   0.01 
(0.33) (0.32) (0.33)   (0.21) 
      
      
0.27      
(0.27)      
 -0.59     
 (0.26)     
  0.16    
  (0.49)    
  -0.12    
  (0.45)    
  -0.17    
  (0.54)    
  -0.24    
  (0.33)    
-3.21 -1.25 -1.51 0.67 0.57 0.57 
(1.93) (0.63) (0.72) (0.14) (0.23) (0.24) 
156.4 157.0 167.3 18.6 20.6 22.6 
182.1 183.7 204.0 22.9 27.2 30.2 
-70.2 -70.5 -72.6    
140.4 141.0 145.3    
183 208 208 22 22 22 
24 24 24 17 17 17 
29 29 29 18 18 18 
0 0 0    
1 1 1 0.33 0.33 0.35 
Legislative initiation. Panel (b): Constituent assembly sample; the outcome is Reelection. 
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Figure 3. Predicted Probability of Initiating a Constitutional Reform, Condi-
tional on Expectations, under Different Scenarios 
 
 
Note:  Broken lines indicate 90 percent confidence intervals. All results based on 
model 2, Table 2, assuming Reelected governor = 0. 
To get a sense of the magnitude of these findings, Figure 3 presents the 
predicted probability of initiating a reform as Expectations increases across 
its range, conditional on the opposition’s capacity to veto a reform.36 
Figure 3a supports the claim that the effect of Supermajority is large in 
magnitude and independent of the expectations of the opposition. Alt-
hough the slope of the curve is positive, the substantive effect is small: 
increasing Expectations along its interquartile range (from 0.26 to 0.41) 
only raises the probability of initiating a reform from 0.50 to 0.61. This is 
not a large effect, especially if we consider that the probability of initiat-
ing a reform was already high at the lower quartile of Expectations. Figure 
3b indicates that if the opposition is divided, the probability of initiating 
a reform increases with Expectations, from 0.17 to 0.25 – an insignificant 
difference. Finally, Figure 3c shows that when a single opposition party 
can veto a reform, increasing Expectations across its interquartile range 
cuts the probability of initiating a reform almost in half, from 0.22 to 
0.12. In other words, we go from expecting one reform every two gu-
bernatorial terms (four two-year periods) to one every four terms.37 
                                                 
36  All results are based on model 2, with Reelected governor set to 0. Given the small 
sample size, we display 90 percent rather than 95 percent confidence intervals. 
37  Additional analyses (available upon request) show that these results are similar 
when using different samples (adding vice-governors or interim governors, or 
restricting the analysis to governors who finished their mandate), fitting condi-
tional logit models instead of random effects, or adding additional controls. 
The findings are somewhat more sensitive to other measures of the expecta-
tions of the opposition, which reflects the fact that these are less adequate 
measures of the underlying concept of interest: what matters is how the oppo-
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Constituent Assemblies and the Reelection Clause 
Table 2b presents the results for the sample of constituent assemblies. 
Model 8 includes only Majority and Single party veto as predictors. Con-
sistent with the first hypothesis, the point estimate for the first variable 
indicates that if the governor’s party controls an absolute majority of 
seats in the assembly, the probability of relaxing term limits increases by 
33 percentage points over the baseline probability of 0.67 – indeed, all 
assemblies in which the incumbent party controlled an absolute majority 
of seats introduced executive reelection. Conversely, the negative point 
estimate for Single party veto indicates that if a single opposition party can 
veto the assembly’s decisions, the probability that the governor will be 
allowed to run for a new term decreases by 42 percentage points. The 
next two models examine whether the probability of introducing reelec-
tion is also driven by the Expectations of the opposition. This seems to be 
the case: as in the previous section, the point estimates for Expectations 
are positive but small in magnitude and very unreliable, while the interac-
tion with Single party veto is large and negative. The estimates are some-
what imprecise, but this is to be expected given that we are including an 
interaction in a very small sample. Model 10 also shows that including a 
dummy for Reelected governor has no impact on the results. This is con-
sistent with the interpretation suggested before: reelected governors 
might find it harder to convince the public (and the legislature) of the 
need to reform the constitution to run for a third term, but once this 
obstacle is surmounted, there is no reason why they should be less suc-
cessful in a constituent assembly. 
Conclusion 
This paper began by asking why some incumbent executives are able to 
relax term limits when the option of unilateral imposition is off the table. 
To answer this puzzle, we treated the process of constitutional reform as 
a bargaining game between a term-limited executive and one or more 
opposition parties. This generates two implications that the existing 
literature has overlooked. First, opposition parties that expect to do well 
in the upcoming election have more to lose if the executive runs for 
reelection, so they should be more inclined to keep term limits in place. 
Second, this effect should be stronger when a single opposition party can 
                                                                                                    
sition expects to do in the next gubernatorial election, and thus its past vote 
share is the most adequate proxy. 
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veto a constitutional reform by itself, because this prevents the executive 
from playing a “divide-and-rule” strategy. In line with these claims, the 
empirical findings show that Argentine governors were most likely to 
initiate a reform involving term limits when their party controlled a su-
permajority of seats in the provincial legislature, and least likely when a 
single opposition party could veto a reform and expected to do well in 
the next executive election. Although the small sample size reduces the 
reliability of the estimates, the magnitude of the effects is substantial: a 
governor whose party controls a supermajority of seats has a better-than-
even chance of initiating a reform; but if an opposition party can veto a 
reform, increasing Expectations across its interquartile range decreases the 
probability of reform from little more than one in five to one in eight. 
The behavior of constituent assemblies seems to follow a similar logic, 
although the small sample size prevents us from reaching a more defini-
tive conclusion. 
Throughout this paper, we have focused on the relaxation of execu-
tive term limits in the Argentine provinces, but our argument can also 
help illuminate other processes of institutional or constitutional change. 
We focused on term limits both because they pose such obvious con-
straints on the incumbent (Baturo 2010, 2014), and because they repre-
sent a precondition for enjoying the other perks of executive office: an 
incumbent whose term is about to expire probably has few incentives to 
spend political capital to increase his or her successor’s powers. None-
theless, the logic of the argument can easily be extended to other power-
concentrating institutions, such as executive decree authority.  
In terms of geographical coverage, this paper can shed light on pro-
cesses of constitutional reform taking place elsewhere. As mentioned 
above, our argument can extend Negretto’s (2013) account of constitu-
tion-making in Latin America by making more precise predictions about 
the conditions that should facilitate agreements between the executive 
and the opposition. Similarly, our argument can help explain the origins 
of electoral authoritarian regimes; that is, political regimes that combine 
formal democratic institutions with an electoral playing field that is 
heavily skewed in favor of the ruling party – due to electoral fraud, say, 
or because the incumbent monopolizes media access. Although these 
regimes have received a lot of attention recently (Schedler 2006, 2013; 
Levitsky and Way 2002, 2010; Morse 2012; Brancati 2014), few authors 
have noticed that their origin often lies in the restriction of democratic 
competition – through a “self-coup” or the gradual erosion of political 
liberties – rather than in the (incomplete) liberalization of a non-electoral 
regime (for exceptions, see Levitsky and Way 2002, Maeda 2010, Main-
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waring and Pérez-Liñán 2014, and Svolik 2015, 2017). This suggests a 
similar puzzle to the one that motivates this paper, i.e., how can demo-
cratically elected executives manipulate elections to such an extent that 
future alternation in power becomes unlikely? How can incumbents get 
away with large-scale fraud and other forms of undemocratic behavior in 
a context in which formal institutions are explicitly designed to prevent 
such kind of actions (Acemoglu, Robinson, and Torvik 2013)? The fact 
that most Argentine provinces, despite being democratic,38 share im-
portant similarities with competitive authoritarian regimes – including 
extensive patronage networks, reactive legislatures, and a fragmented 
opposition – raises the possibility that similar mechanisms might be at 
work in both cases. Indeed, the examples of Peru in the 1990s or Vene-
zuela after 1998 suggest that a divided and discredited opposition can 
play a key role in allowing incumbents to get away with power-con-
centrating attempts (Cameron 1998; Corrales and Penfold-Becerra 2011). 
Finally, we have assumed in this paper that incumbents respect the 
letter of the law, in the sense that they comply with formal constitutional 
requirements for amending term limits. We made this assumption be-
cause our theoretical argument focuses on the relationship between the 
incumbent and the opposition in the legislature, and also because most 
constitutional reforms that took place in the Argentine provinces fol-
lowed this template. However, other ways of relaxing term limits are 
possible: some Argentine governors managed to run for reelection 
thanks to a favorable ruling by the provincial Supreme Court,39 a tactic 
that is not unheard of in other parts of the world (Maltz 2007); while in 
Santa Cruz in 1997, Néstor Kirchner skipped the supermajority require-
ment by calling a constituent assembly via a popular referendum, a move 
that was not permitted by the constitution (Fuertes 2000). Given that 
such strategies appear less costly than passing a constitutional reform 
through the legislature – many governors control the composition of the 
provincial courts, even if they lack a supermajority in the provincial legis-
lature (Chavez 2003, 2004; Leiras, Giraudy, and Tuñón 2015) – why do 
                                                 
38  With some exceptions, such as Santiago del Estero between 1995 and 2004 (see 
Gibson 2005), most Argentine provinces have remained democratic since 1983. 
Nonetheless, most authors agree that provincial politics has become less com-
petitive since 1983 (see Calvo and Murillo 2005; Giraudy 2009; Gervasoni 
2010). 
39  Eduardo Angeloz (Córdoba, 1991), Jorge Escobar (San Juan, 1999) and Edu-
ardo Fellner (Jujuy, 2003). In addition, the national Supreme Court prevented 
Gerardo Zamora (Santiago del Estero) from running again in 2013 after the 
provincial court had determined that he could stand for reelection. 
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incumbents not resort to them more often? And under what conditions 
do the opposition and the general public accept such tactics, even if 
grudgingly? If such strategies have some hidden costs or are only possi-
ble under certain circumstances, what are these costs? Understanding 
when and why incumbents, in Argentina and elsewhere, agree to follow 
the letter of the constitution even when they would prefer not to (Young 
and Posner 2007) remains a fascinating but underexplored issue for fu-
ture research. 
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Appendix 
Table A1. List of Provincial Laws Mandating a Constitutional Reform in the 
Argentine Provinces, 1983–2017 
Id Province Year Law # Modality Term 
Limits 
Legislative 
Initiation 
1 Buenos Aires 1989 10859 Amendment 1 1 
2 Buenos Aires 1993 11488 Assembly 1 1 
3 Catamarca 1988 4522 Assembly 1 1 
4 Chaco 1993 3952 Assembly 1 1 
5 Chubut 1987 2991 Amendment 0 0 
6 Chubut 1992 3699 Amendment 0 0 
7 Chubut 1993 3924 Assembly 1 1 
8 Córdoba 1986 7420 Assembly 1 1 
9 Córdoba 2001 8947 Assembly 0 0 
10 Corrientes 1992 4593 Assembly 1 N/A* 
11 Corrientes 2006 5692 Assembly 1 1 
12 Entre Ríos 2007 9768 Assembly 1 0 
13 Formosa 1988 783 Assembly 1 1 
14 Formosa 2002 1406 Assembly 1 1 
15 Jujuy 1985 4158 Assembly 1 1 
16 La Pampa 1993 1523 Assembly 1 1 
17 La Pampa 1998 1812 Assembly 1 1 
18 La Rioja 1984 4469 Assembly 1 1 
19 La Rioja 1986 4826 Amendment 0 0 
20 La Rioja 1986 4863 Amendment 0 0 
21 La Rioja 1996 6208 Assembly 0 0 
22 La Rioja 2001 7150 Assembly 0 0 
23 La Rioja 2007 8135 Amendment 1 0 
24 La Rioja 2007 8183 Assembly 0 0 
25 Mendoza 1985 5047 Amendment 0 0 
26 Mendoza 1987 5197 Assembly 1 0 
27 Mendoza 1990 5499 Amendment 0 0 
28 Mendoza 1990 5557 Amendment 0 0 
29 Mendoza 1997 6524 Amendment 0 0 
30 Mendoza 2001 6896 Assembly 1 1 
31 Mendoza 2005 7405 Amendment 0 0 
32 Mendoza 2007 7405 Amendment 0 0 
33 Mendoza 2010 8252 Amendment 0 0 
34 Misiones 1988 2604 Amendment 1 1 
35 Misiones 2000 3651 Amendment 0 0 
36 Misiones 2003 3999 Amendment 0 0 
37 Misiones 2003 4000 Amendment 0 0 
38 Misiones 2006 4306 Assembly 1 1 
39 Neuquén 1993 2039 Amendment 1 1 
40 Neuquén 2003 2433 Amendment 0 0 
41 Neuquén 2004 2471 Assembly 0 0 
42 Río Negro 1986 2087 Assembly 1 1 
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Id Province Year Law # Modality Term 
Limits 
Legislative 
Initiation 
43 Río Negro 1991 2464 Amendment 0 0 
44 Salta 1984 6269 Assembly 1 1 
45 Salta 1997 6955 Assembly 1 1 
46 Salta 2003 7232 Assembly 1 1 
47 Salta 2003 7246 Amendment 0 0 
48 San Juan 1985 5419 Assembly 1 1 
49 San Juan 2011 8199 Amendment 1 1 
50 San Luis 1986 4702 Assembly 1 1 
51 San Luis 2002 5335 Assembly 1 0 
52 San Luis 2004 5761 Assembly 1 0 
53 San Luis 2006 XII-
0545-
2006 
Amendment 1 0 
54 San Luis 2011 XIII-
0755-
2011 
Amendment 0 0 
55 Santa Cruz 1993 1887 Assembly 1 1 
56 Santa Cruz 1998 2481 Assembly 1 0** 
57 Santiago 1985 5500 Assembly 1 1 
58 Santiago 1997 6377 Assembly 1 1 
59 Santiago*** 2002 6593 Assembly 1 1 
60 Santiago 2005 6736 Assembly 1 0 
61 Tucumán 1988 5903 Assembly 1 1 
62 Tucumán 2002 7194 Assembly 1 1 
63 Tucumán 2004 7469 Assembly 1 1 
Note:  This table lists all laws initiating a constitutional reform. Year indicates the year 
in which the provincial legislature passed the constitutional reform law mandat-
ing the reform; this may not coincide with the year in which the reform was ef-
fectively implemented. Law # is the law ID according to the provincial indexing 
system. Modality specifies whether the law called for the election of a constit-
uent assembly, or established an amendment that had to be ratified via a ref-
erendum. Term limits indicates whether the reform in question involved term 
limits, while Legislative initiation specifies how we coded the dependent var-
iable for the main analysis. Instances of term limits = 1 and Legislative initiation 
= 0 are possible if, for example, the incumbent governor at the time of the re-
form could not have benefited from relaxing term limits (Mendoza 1987, Entre 
Ríos 2007), or if the reform re-introduced term limits where they did not exist 
(La Rioja 2007, San Luis 2006). 
(*) The reform was adopted when a representative of the national government 
(interventor federal) who was not eligible to run for office was in charge of the 
governorship; thus, the corresponding two-year period is not included in the 
sample. 
(**) Coded as 0 because the constitutional reform law did not receive the sup-
port of two-thirds of provincial legislators, as specified in the provincial consti-
tution (Fuertes 2000). 
(***) Not included in the sample because the incumbent governor could stand 
for reelection at the end of his/her term. 
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Table A2. List of Constituent Assemblies in the Argentine Provinces, 
1983–2017 
Id Province Year In 
Sample
Term 
Limits 
Reelection 
(Full) 
Reelection 
1 Buenos Aires 1994 1 1 Limited 1 
2 Catamarca 1988 0 1 Unlimited 1 
3 Chaco 1994 1 1 Limited 1 
4 Chubut 1994 1 1 Limited 1 
5 Córdoba 1986 1 1 Limited 1 
6 Córdoba 2001 0 0 N/A N/A 
7 Corrientes 1992 0 1 not introduced 0 
8 Corrientes 2007 1 1 Limited 1 
9 Entre Ríos 2007 0 1 Limited 1 
10 Formosa 1991* 0 1 Limited 1 
11 Formosa 2003 1 1 Unlimited 1 
12 Jujuy 1985 1 1 not introduced 0 
13 La Pampa 1994 1 1 limited 1 
14 La Pampa 1998 1 1 limited 1 
15 La Rioja 1985 1 1 unlimited 1 
16 La Rioja 1997 0 0 N/A N/A 
17 La Rioja 2002* 0 0 N/A N/A 
18 La Rioja 2007 0 1 limited 0** 
19 Misiones 2006 1 1 not introduced 0 
20 Neuquén 2005 0 0 N/A N/A 
21 Río Negro 1986 1 1 limited 1 
22 Salta 1985 1 1 not introduced 0 
23 Salta 1997 1 1 limited 1 
24 Salta 2003 1 1 limited 1 
25 San Juan 1985 1 1 limited 1 
26 San Luis 1986 1 1 unlimited 1 
27 Santa Cruz 1994 1 1 limited 1 
28 Santa Cruz 1998 0 1 unlimited 1 
29 Santiago 1985 1 1 not introduced 0 
30 Santiago 1997 1 1 limited 1 
31 Santiago 2002 0 1 not introduced 0 
32 Santiago 2005 0 1 limited 1 
33 Tucumán 1989 1 1 not introduced 0 
34 Tucumán 2005 1 1 limited 1 
Note:  This table lists all constituent assemblies that took place in the Argentine 
provinces between 1983 and 2017. Year indicates the year in which the as-
sembly was elected; this may not coincide with the year in which the new con-
stitution was adopted. In sample indicates whether the assembly is included in 
the analysis reported in Table 2b. Term limits indicates whether the assembly 
could change the clause involving term limits. Reelection (full) specifies the 
term limits clause adopted by the assembly, while Reelection specifies the 
coding of the dependent variable in the analysis reported in Table 2b. 
(*) Year in which the new constitution was adopted. The exact date in which 
the assembly was elected is unclear. 
(**) Before the reform, the governor could get reelected indefinitely. 
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¿Con una Mano de la Oposición? Introduciendo la Reelección 
Ejecutiva en las Provincias Argentinas, 1983–2017 
Resumen: ¿Cómo puede el oficialismo introducir la reelección ejecutiva 
cuando no tiene la posibilidad de imponer sus preferencias de manera 
unilateral? Interpretando una reforma constitucional como un juego de 
negociación entre un ejecutivo sin posibilidad de reelegirse y la oposi-
ción, en este artículo sostenemos que una reforma que incluya la reelec-
ción ejecutiva será más probable cuando (a) el partido de gobierno pueda 
cambiar la constitución unilateralmente o (b) la oposición sea pesimista 
sobre su desempeño electoral en el futuro; además, (c) este segundo 
efecto debería ser especialmente relevante cuando un único partido opo-
sitor pueda vetar una reforma constitucional, porque ello impide al ejecu-
tivo adoptar una estrategia de “dividir para reinar.” Para evaluar este 
argumento, examinamos la introducción de la reelección ejecutiva en las 
provincias argentinas entre 1983 y 2017. En línea con las expectativas, 
los resultados muestran que la probabilidad de iniciar una reforma insti-
tucional es máxima cuando el partido oficialista controla una supermayo-
ría de bancas en la legislatura provincial, pero disminuye abruptamente 
cuando un partido opositor puede vetar una reforma, y este partido espe-
ra tener un buen desempeño en la próxima elección para gobernador. 
Palabras clave: Argentina, cambio institucional, cambio constitucional, 
relección ejecutiva, política subnacional 
